

IMPETUS



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JOINT VISIT OF THE EU POLITICAL SECURITY COMMITTEE AND THE AFRICAN UNION TO CAR, MARCH 2018

EU MILITARY STAFF CONTRIBUTING TO EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

**OPERATION ATALANTA -
EXPLOITING MILITARY
EQUITY FOR DIPLOMATIC
EFFECT - P4**

**REVISITING THE EU'S SECURITY
PARTNERSHIPS - P8**

**EU participation in NATO
flagship Cyber Defence
Exercise - P20**

Dear Readers,

We hope that you find IMPETUS 25 useful in increasing your situational awareness of what the EU Military Staff are doing, including EU CSDP Operations and Missions. If you have any comments on any of the articles, or indeed any suggestions on how IMPETUS could be improved, we would be very happy to receive both at the email address below. Back issues are available on request from the address below.

Thank you,
the Editor.

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
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EUROPEAN UNION CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS 2018



Legend:

- █ Military Operations
- █ Civilian Operations

6 on-going military Missions

10 on-going civilian Missions

Circa 5,000 people currently deployed

Objectives:

keeping the peace, preventing conflicts strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, prevention of human trafficking and piracy.

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*This Mission is not managed within CSDP structures and hence is strictly speaking not a "CSDP Mission". However its objectives are very similar to the other CSDP Missions and so we include it here.

OPERATION

Lessons from EU NAVFOR Somalia, Operation Atalanta: **Exploiting military equity for diplomatic effect**

BY MR. PAUL MITCHAM – POLITICAL ADVISOR, OHQ EU NAVFOR ATALANTA



It is a curious irony that the political and diplomatic equity of CSDP operations has often been recognised more quickly by international partners than by Member States themselves. With the EU's first CSDP maritime operation now in its tenth year, and the EU Maritime Security Strategy under revision, this is perhaps a good point to assess not only what the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) has achieved militarily; but also how our collective political, economic and diplomatic efforts might benefit further from the success of the European Union's enduring naval presence in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean regions.

EU NAVFOR was launched in December 2008, just ten weeks after the relevant Council Decision, but still several years before the EEAS was established. Operation ATALANTA quickly had to stand on its own two feet, forging its own relationships with regional governments, national and multinational military forces; with the global shipping industry's various representative organisations; and with a myriad of agency (especially UN) partners, in order to tackle the damaging effect of Somali piracy on European and international trade.

Storming, forming, norming...

The passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1816 in June 2008 led to the launch of a dedicated NATO (Operation ALLIED PROVIDER), Indian counter-piracy patrols that October; Russian naval patrols from November; then EU NAVFOR in early December, itself quickly followed by a dedicated Chinese counter-piracy task force (the first Chinese warships to deploy outside the Asia-Pacific since the 15th century). The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) launched Task Force

151 in January 2009, followed by the Japanese; the Koreans in March; and then NATO's Operation OCEAN SHIELD in August. Together, they represented almost 60 UN members. Many EU Member State navies had been countering piracy on the High Seas for hundreds of years (although probably hadn't needed to use their legislation within the last century). A common history facilitated a shared understanding of the problem and a more rapid desire to work together in the region affected. For many of our military partners, however, counter-piracy was a wholly new endeavour.


With time, these efforts have brought naval forces closer together, united in one common cause, and promoting new degrees of cooperation. Military exercises, from the simplest 'passex' or passing exercise, right up to multinational exercises like the US-led CUTLASS EXPRESS series have contributed to this spirit of collaboration.

Of course, international efforts to maintain freedom of navigation, especially in the Gulf of Aden (the uninterrupted flow of maritime commerce is strategically vital and not just for Member States oil and natural gas supplies) required spatial management. Both military and commercial shipping would clearly benefit from SHARED Awareness and DE-confliction (SHADE). Thus the SHADE process was born, and the Internationally-Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) agreed, to maximise convoy protection in keeping commercial shipping away from Somali pirates. EU NAVFOR soon took on the role of trusted organiser, coordinating IRTC transits on behalf of the international community. It's Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) still runs the online chat room MERCURY, a real-time information-sharing tool for

more than 120 intelligence, security, national law enforcement and naval operation centres worldwide. MSCHOA remains well trusted by commercial shipping operators, registering the details of some 5,600 ships every month (i.e. more than 85% of total transits).

An inherently international focus

Although the risk of piracy is much reduced the SHADE conference still takes place biannually. SHADE brings together all the (military and civilian) working-level stakeholders, to present, discuss and agree counter-piracy developments. The November 2017 meeting saw inputs from delegations as diverse as the US Fifth Fleet; the Russian National Defence Control Centre; and the Indian Directorate of Naval Operations, as well as EU NAVFOR, making SHADE utterly unique.



SHADE also complements the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), founded under UN auspices, bringing together more than 80 delegations at the strategic and operational level. The EU chaired the CGPCS from 2014-16 and EU NAVFOR remains at the forefront of its work, with direct interests in the legal, operational, strategic communication and capacity-building efforts that the international community invests in countering piracy.

Somali conflict, lawlessness and state fragmentation are, of course, at the root of Somali piracy. So the work that EU CSDP interventions undertake is closely connected to the restoration of Somali state structure and governance. Fundamentally, EU NAVFOR exists to uphold freedom of navigation for global shipping on the High Seas. Policing the international waters of the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean is necessary because regional states themselves lack such a capability. EU NAVFOR has therefore developed a recognised place for the EU in the maritime security architecture of the entire region.

Power projection

As regional partners frequently explain, security in the African Horn is inseparable from security in the Arabian Peninsula. With the Yemeni conflict progressively spilling into the maritime domain, and Islamic terrorist sympathies establishing themselves in Somalia, EU NAVFOR has played an important role in the regional maritime security architecture not least in reassuring Arab observers that European naval forces will project power. Diverting an EU NAVFOR warship in October 2016 to demonstrate a show of force offshore was a watershed moment. It impressed upon the Arab mind that EU NAVFOR might act in the face of shared threats, when Islamic State sympathisers overran the coastal town of Qandala. That simple gesture still proves useful currency in EU-Arab relations today.

Interestingly, EU NAVFOR was always foreseen as a vehicle for EU diplomacy. At its launch, then-High-Representative Javier Solana wrote to a number of potential partners, from

the UAE to Malaysia to South Africa, inviting participation. Some, like Norway, and later Ukraine, the Balkan republics and even Korea, have done so under bilateral Framework Participation Agreements. Others, like the Colombian Navy, have gone to huge lengths to collaborate at sea with EU NAVFOR. For EU Candidate Countries in particular, operating within EU NAVFOR has been beneficial at multiple levels. It increases the interoperability of individuals, while demonstrating the intent and credibility of military forces to support CSDP objectives.



EU NAVFOR FCdr Admiral Rafael Fernandez-Pintado Munoz-Rojas welcomes CO of ROKS Choi Young on board Op ATALANTA Flagship ESPS GALICIA

Exploiting EU Naval Diplomacy

By the time this article comes to press, EU NAVFOR will have overseen the safe delivery of nearly 1.75 million tonnes of UN World Food Programme humanitarian assistance to African ports. In so doing, the visible deterrence effect of EU NAVFOR warships will have reassured enough smaller coastal traders to regenerate Arab-Somali trading routes. This reminds us that the Gulf of Aden should never be viewed as a gulf, but rather as the historical 'zip' that binds the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region tightly together. But it has been equally important at the regional macro-economic level, especially for maritime economies like the Seychelles.

The EU has not achieved this alone. Patrolling almost 8.7M square kilometres, EU NAVFOR does occasionally require external assistance, and when necessary outsources WFP security protection to foreign navies. The US, Russia, and more latterly China, have all provided WFP ship-to-ship protection on the EU's behalf. As the One Belt, One Road Initiative progresses, working with China in this regard has been an important demonstration of our ability to cooperate tactically. High level negotiations are now underway with India to do similarly.

EU NAVFOR now operates within a far more integrated approach to Somalia than ever could have been foreseen when launched, harnessing all the levers of economic and diplomatic power that the EU today offers. But Europe's Near Abroad is not the only region in which new doors might be opened by naval diplomacy. Our outreach – indeed, much of the strength of the EU's military relationships with the likes of China and India – is based on the shared maritime response to piracy that we have undertaken together in one area, but which might bear effect in another. Indeed, an entire spectrum of relationships has been built up by EU NAVFOR since 2008, potentially ripe for exploitation across both the EEAS and Commission.

Leveraging the power of something as militarily successful as Operation ATALANTA is something we should take seriously. The EU flag that flies on EU NAVFOR warships east of Suez is something which the global community has grown to respect. Its wider potential for the future should not be under-estimated. ■

Europe's Security and Defence in the 21st Century

Future Role of the EU Military Staff

BY LT GEN ESA PULKKINEN, DG EUMS & DIRECTOR MPCC

DG EUMS and Dir MPCC, Lt Gen Pulkkinen visiting EUTM RCA in Oct 2017



With a constantly evolving security environment and the impact of the implementation of the EU's Global Strategy, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) is facing new challenges. In addition to the traditional EUMS tasks associated with the EU's military missions and operations, new commitments have emerged, especially those related to capability development, situational awareness, regional initiatives and the planning and conduct of missions and operations.

This article considers the role of the EU's military as an integral part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its place in the context of this developing landscape.

The role of the EUMS is to develop and provide the support framework for the employment of European and partner nation's military forces in CSDP operations and missions in coordination with other instruments **supporting the EU's integrated approach to conflicts and crises**. As such, the EUMS is the sole provider of military expertise within the EEAS.

Based on a clear delineation of responsibilities between the EUMS and the newly established Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), and taking into consideration the review of the latter by the end of 2018, the EUMS has now also started a process in order to identify tasks that are not directly linked to ongoing EU missions and operations but

are necessary for the maintenance of the EU's military framework, as previously mentioned.

In addition to the need to maintain Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)(CFSP/CSDP) – related tasks, the EUMS must be prepared to contribute to the ongoing political discussion reflecting the implementation of the EU's foreign and security policy as derived from the EU's Global Strategy (EUGS). This will include the EUMS's contribution to the further development of a **European Security Architecture**, in particular the:

- Enhanced Situational Awareness within the framework of Single Intelligence Analytical Capability (SIAC)
- Establishment of the process for the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)
- Implementation of and contribution to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO);
- European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), European Defence Fund (EDF); and the European Defence Industry Development Programme (EDIDP);
- Review of the EU's Requirements Catalogue;
- Prioritisation of military capabilities;
- Strengthening of Defence Cooperation initiatives;
- Review/Adaption of current C4I structures;
- Development/ Establishment of multinational formations/structures;

- Development of Military Requirements to improve Military Mobility within Europe;
- Review/Adaption of rapid response concepts;
- Review of financial mechanisms;
- Contribution to the European Peace Facility (EPF);
- Strengthening of strategic partnerships.

In this context the EUMS is facing new challenges and hence its role organisation may need to be adapted. We need to adapt the EUMS' mission to meet these new requirements.

Today the EUMS is an integral part of the EEAS. Working within the EEAS under the direction of the HR/VP, Political and Security Committee (PSC) and EU Military Committee (EUMC) provides tangible benefits; military inputs regarding CFSP/CSDP and Europe's Security and Defence are provided almost directly without being impeded by unnecessary bureaucracy. This close and regular interaction with the other members of the CSDP family within the EEAS also supports the overall development of EU's security and defence.

However, the mission, role and specified tasks of the EUMS as laid down in the Terms of Reference (ToR) as decided by the Council in June 2017; do not reflect the reality of the EUMS' daily business today. Some of the shortfalls arise from new emerging roles of other EEAS entities which require EUMS support and resources. This applies in particular to "Early warning (EW)" and "Situational assessment (SA)" where other EEAS instruments have taken the lead but the EUMS is heavily involved.

So, some of the most challenging tasks for the future have until now been seen as secondary, but this can no longer continue. These tasks include the military contribution to the EU Global Strategy, managing military input to the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) and the military initiatives related to the broader Security Sector Reform (SSR); e.g. projects such as the G5 Sahel initiative. Alongside these, the needs to provide the fundamental military requirements for military mobility and the military contribution to the Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF) are crucial to meeting future threats. This also includes the development and provision of an EU specific military conceptual framework and contribution to the EU's military capability development plans, and, together with the European Defence Agency (EDA) in its role in the wider field of military training, exercises and the Lessons Learnt process. Ongoing cooperation with national and multinational HQs and military organisations, emergency support to civil entities with both experts and assets, and a leading role in identifying civ-mil synergies must also be seriously considered.

In order to deliver these new emerging tasks, subject-related expertise must be available in the form of an appropriate and fully functional staff. The main task of the EUMS will therefore be to focus on the provision of the framework required to employ military force as one of EU's instruments to meet EU's political and strategic aims and objectives.

The establishment of this support framework for the employment of EU military in CSDP

operations and missions is the precondition for the Commander to be able to fulfil his Strategic Tasks; i.e. to provide situational awareness; to generate, train and deploy and be able to direct, support, sustain and recover the force. The execution of these strategic tasks rests with the approved and existing Command and Control Structure.

In order to achieve this, the conceptual work and in particular the military input to the capability development process, must be staffed by the EUMS at the political-strategic level under the direction of the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Therefore the future role of the EUMS will be to continue to provide the best possible strategic military advice and staff support to the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and to strengthen as much as possible the cooperation with the CSDP family as a whole, but especially with civil entities in the EEAS and the Commission.

The MPCC, established in June 2017 is the first time that the EU has had its own dedicated C2 capability for military missions at Brussels level. According to the Council Decision of 8 June 2017, the High Representative should conduct a review of the establishment of the MPCC and the Joint Support Coordination Cell by the end of this year. Earlier this year, under the guidance of the HR, the EUMS started the military-technical work of this review. In addition to providing feasible options for future political decision making on the way-ahead, this will also afford us an opportunity, in parallel to the review process, to consider the possible adaptation of the EUMS in order to fulfil its new tasks and requirements.

Pending political approval, the updated role of the EUMS may therefore lead to an adapted 'fit for purpose' structure that acknowledges the emerging security and defence environment. We should recognise that the main driver for adaptation is the "Integrated Approach" requiring close coordination between the civil and the military components of the EEAS, as envisaged for the MPCC and already as established within the Single Intelligence Analytical Capability.

The role of the EUMS within this updated framework remains pivotal; it is a key enabler for the implementation of CFSP/CSDP for the delivery of Europe's security and defence and as a guarantor of European values. ■



Lt Gen Esa Pulkkinen, DG EUMS & Dir MPCC with Maj Gen Blazquez, COS EUROCORPS and former Mission Force Commander of EUTM RCA.

Revisiting the EU's Security Partnerships*

BY DR. THIERRY TARDY



Recent evolutions in the security realm within and at the periphery of Europe have led to a series of responses and adaptations from the European Union, within the context of the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS). At the heart of these responses to tackle current security challenges are the questions of 'what to do', with 'what capabilities', and 'with whom'. The latter relates to the interaction between the EU and third parties, be they states or institutions. How can the EU reach out to these third parties so as to best guarantee its own security?

In its May 2017 Conclusions, the Council of the EU reiterated its commitment to develop a 'more strategic approach of CSDP cooperation with partner countries.' More specifically, the Council called for the development of CSDP cooperation with partner countries in areas that are not necessarily part of CSDP operations and missions per se. This bears particular resonance given that the UK is due to become a third state in 2019.

CSDP partnerships have traditionally focused on two sets of issues: the role of third countries in CSDP operations; and partnerships between the EU and international organisations. More recently, the EU has started to reach out to third states on other security matters, such as terrorism and migration, but also hybrid threats, cyber, and resilience issues.

These evolutions are positive in the sense that they attest to a desire on the part of the EU to be more reactive to evolving threats; yet what characterises the EU's partnership policies in the security domain is their fragmentation and overall weak conceptualisation. The EU partners with some countries on CSDP operations, with others on counter-terrorism, and with a third group on migration, but the overall coherence of these policies, as well as their visibility is yet to be ensured. In other words, these various policy tracks lack a strategic direction.

What partners?

A key question for all partnership policies is that of prioritisation of partners. Which third countries the EU should establish partnerships with, and on the basis of what criteria? Beyond geography, intuitively partners must share the EU's values, as well as represent an interest for European security, either as security consumers or providers.


A broad typology of potential partners includes at least six categories that overlap to a large extent:

- countries where CSDP operations and missions are deployed (currently 11 countries for 16 operations);
- countries that have signed a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU regulating their participation to CSDP operations (18 + Switzerland which although it has not signed an FPA, is regularly contributing to CSDP operations);
- countries with which the EU has political dialogues on counter-terrorism (more than 20 states, including 13 where the EU has posted security officers);
- European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries (16);
- candidate countries (5) and potential candidates (2);
- countries with which the EU has signed Migration Compacts (8).

This typology features states that differ significantly in terms of: a) the security interest that they represent for the EU; b) what they can bring to the EU's security policy, as well as their willingness to work with the EU on a broad security agenda; and c) the extent to which they share the EU's values and therefore can legitimately cooperate with the EU.

* This text is an excerpt from T. Tardy, 'Revisiting the EU's security partnerships', Brief No.1, EUISS, 201a8.

The Prioritisation Triangle



Prioritisation must result from an assessment of these three variables and how each weighs in the overall analysis.

Such a typology also shows the heterogeneity of third states. For obvious reasons, the US or Norway – and soon the UK – are by nature different from, say, Kosovo, Jordan, Mali or Turkey. Not only are third states different from one another, but they may also belong to several of the above six categories, and therefore embrace a security agenda that goes well beyond CSDP operations.

What partnerships?

How strategic?

A more strategic approach to partnership implies that the parallel tracks of dialogues on CSDP operations, counter-terrorism, migration or resilience are not only better coordinated but also upgraded so that they become more ambitious and mutually-reinforcing. While each track is currently being conceived and implemented separately from the others, thinking and acting more strategically requires that they all become one dimension of a broader grand design.

In impact terms, acting more strategically implies that concessions on EU principles cannot be a priori ruled out. The security environment at the European periphery is such that the 'impact imperative' is likely to create constant tensions between interests and values as presented in the prioritisation triangle, with no easy way out. Dealing with countries such as Libya or Egypt are cases in point. Their stability is essential to the EU's own security and therefore working with them is imperative, yet such cooperation offers no guarantee that EU values and principles are always preserved.

Beyond CSDP

By their nature, CSDP missions and operations contribute to the stability of third states where they operate. And cooperation with third states has also taken the form of their participation in CSDP operations and missions, formalised through so-called Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs).

This said, addressing common challenges with third states today requires a broader approach than the one defined by CSDP operations to include activities such as counter-terrorism, responses to hybrid threats, tackling migration-related phenomena, cybersecurity, or resilience-building. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is now involved in a significant number of these activities in cooperation with third states. And the 2015 ENP Review Joint Communication includes a security dimension with

priority areas such as security sector reform; tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation; disrupting organised crime; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear risk mitigation; crisis management and response; and CSDP.

This leads to two tracks of security cooperation, one that is directly linked to CSDP operations, and another one that is not. The question is then how the CSDP operation track and the broader security track can be coordinated so that they are mutually reinforcing. An FPA is a relatively narrow agreement which could be upgraded not only to strengthen cooperation with third states in CSDP operations but also to include other considerations that are of common interest to both parties.

The HR/VP recently mentioned the idea to "create a mechanism for closer and more constant coordination with the non-EU countries involved in our missions". CSDP would then be used as a platform for developing other forms of security cooperation.

Towards 'Security Compacts'?

Although the need for a more coherent or strategic approach to the EU's security cooperation with third states is widely acknowledged, its operationalisation presents a number of challenges.

First is the issue of the type of framework that can be resorted to. Being strategic has to do with institutionalisation, yet flexibility and tailor-made frameworks are also essential to ensure effectiveness.

The other dimension of the framework issue is whether security cooperation should be the object of a dedicated instrument or whether it simply has to be mainstreamed in existing cooperation channels. Within the Revised ENP, for example, the security dimension is now embedded into broader frameworks, but one idea is also to consolidate existing but parallel security aspects into dedicated 'Security Compacts'. Such Compacts could be established with a selection of third states, based on common security needs and shared responsibilities, and include specific objectives and timelines. This would grant a higher level of visibility to the security domain, as well as hopefully greater coherence to the various EU policy tracks.

A second set of challenges relates to EU internal coordination and the identification of the unit in charge of partnerships in the broader security domain.

EU institutions are not, for the time being, in a position to play a much more strategic role in the field of security cooperation, nor is it a given that member states are willing to give more power to the EU in this domain. Yet the context created by the release of the EUGS – and incidentally the future position of the UK as a third state – provide an opportunity to examine thoroughly how the EU can contribute to third states' security and, maybe most importantly, how in return third states can contribute to the EU's security.

Dr.Thierry Tardy is a Senior Analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies and will shortly take up a position at the NATO Defence College in Rome. ■

PRISM: A Catalyst for the Integrated Approach

BY ROBERTA DIROSA – PRISM

Stefano Tomat (PRISM) and General Rio (EUCAP Mali) discussing the EU support to Central Mali with the Governor of Mopti; the integrated approach in the making.



The Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises is one of the Global Strategy's priorities, with the aim of further strengthening the EU institutions' and Member States' action in this area.

The Integrated Approach is: **multidimensional**, through the use of all available policies and instruments; **multi-phased**, being operational at all stages of the conflict cycle; **multilevel**, acting at the local, national, regional and global levels to address fragility and conflicts; and **multilateral**, engaging all key players involved in a conflict and/or necessary for its resolution, in particular the UN.

In line with the above, **PRISM (Prevention of conflicts, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation)** aims to be a specialised service provider helping to deliver an integrated EU response in fragile and conflict/crisis-affected areas.

Established in January 2017, PRISM reports directly to the Deputy Secretary General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response. It also works under the functional authority of the Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs to ensure political guidance and coherence of action.

In its domain of competence, PRISM supports EU decision-making and action by working closely with EEAS senior management, geographical and relevant thematic teams, EU Delegations, EUSR's, Special Envoys, CSDP structures and EU Commission services. Building on existing work, PRISM; supports improved conflict analysis, provides context-specific technical advice, builds capacity in conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilisation and promotes sensitive EU engagement across the conflict cycle in collaboration with relevant stakeholders.

In close coordination with geographic, CSDP and horizontal departments and services, PRISM is the EEAS focal point, for the programming of relevant resources under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and other instruments aimed at conflict prevention and crisis response.

Main areas of expertise

a) Conflict Prevention

The EU Global Strategy has given a significant boost to conflict prevention, and to strengthening the EU's integrated action in this area. The primary emphasis is on integrated action to prevent the emergence, escalation and spill-over of violent conflict. It aims at generating a step-change in the way the EU works, to move from fire-fighting crisis response mode and dealing with the consequences of violent conflict, to earlier identification of situations at risk, and effective collective and integrated early action including addressing root causes. Given the high recurrence of violent conflict after wars have ended, preventive action can also relate to effective stabilisation and building sustainable peace to prevent the re-emergence of violence.

The EU has reviewed its **Early Warning System (EWS)** to shift the emphasis from early warning to early action and PRISM acts as a convener and facilitator to link the two. The EWS tool encompasses the systematic analysis of information from a variety of sources in order to identify and understand the risks for violent conflict and to develop strategic responses to mitigate these risks. It enables staff across the EU to identify early preventive actions to address those risks. Both Member States Embassies and EU Delegations are now more involved in the process to drive integrated action on the ground. The EEAS then reverts to the Political and Security Committee to report on the EWS findings.

PRISM's peace and conflict advisers support country teams with the design and delivery of joint conflict and situation analysis – increasingly with EU Member States and international partners such as the UN. PRISM promotes and supports structured risk and resilience assessments and interacts with all relevant EU bodies in order to deepen the understanding of fragility, resilience factors, and structural risks of violence, including atrocities. Based on these assessments, it facilitates the elaboration of early action through the application of an integrated approach. PRISM also provides advisory support to geographic teams, including through the deployment of internal and external experts to the field, and providing training support.

PRISM, along with the European Commission, recently supported **analyses on fragile and conflict/crisis-affected countries**. These involved representatives from relevant EU institutions – HQ and field, Member States locally present, as well as the UN, the World Bank and civil society organisations. Joint analysis enables the actors to develop a common understanding of a given context, which can be used to better coordinate and develop joint programmes and strategies

b) Mediation

As part of EU preventive diplomacy, mediation is an integral component of the EU's integrated toolbox for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Since its inception, the EEAS built up an in-house **Mediation Support Team (MST)** tasked with supporting EU institutions and partners with training, technical expertise, advice and real-time support on how to use mediation and dialogue as a tool of first response before, during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts. PRISM can also call on external mediation expertise and technical assistance which strengthens EEAS' mediation engagements and allows it to systematically use mediation in response to emerging crises.

The EU and UN collaborate closely on mediation, both in terms of global promotion of peace mediation, and in specific cases: such as the co-financing of the UN Standby Team of Mediation Experts, and can draw on UN Mediation Experts for specific assignments. The EU and UN work closely together on specific processes, e.g. the UN Special Envoy team for Syria and the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen.

c) Crisis response and stabilisation

The EEAS has developed a Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM), which is a structured system to respond to crises and emergencies. The CRM guarantees the involvement of all relevant EEAS and Commission services and centralises information sharing to ensure that all relevant actors have the same level of knowledge. In the event of a serious situation or emergency concerning or anyway involving the external dimension of the EU, DSG for Crisis Response can activate the EEAS CRM after consultation with or upon request from the HRVP or the Secretary General and EEAS senior managers. The fundamental elements of the Crisis Response Mechanism are: the Crisis Meeting; the catalogue of possible Immediate Action; the Crisis Cell; the Crisis Platform; and the Task Force. PRISM acts as the secretariat of the CRM. PRISM also monitors the coherence of EU interventions at a post-crisis stage in order to prevent a relapse and provides advice to ensure the continuity of EU engagement in the aftermath of crises.

PRISM has finalised, with all relevant services of the EEAS and the Commission, a conceptual framework to define an EU approach to stabilisation. Stabilisation always refers to the political objective to manage the exit from a crisis period in countries/regions suffering from major disorganisation of State structures and torn by internal and transboundary conflicts and violence. It should be seen as a transitory or bridging period, where there is a critical need for intensive action to move from violence to generate sufficient conditions for improved human security and the establishment of a more stable political settlement.

On the operational side, following the Council Decision of 04 August 2017, in the first ever action under Article 28 TEU, a stabilisation action with clear political objectives and com-

prising 10 experts has been deployed to Mopti and Ségou (Mali) for one year. This is a joint effort of MD Africa, FPI and PRISM, in close coordination with relevant Commission services and CSDP missions in the country.

d) SSR/RoL

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is the process of transforming a country's security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law (RoL) and the principles of good governance.

As co-chair of the EU SSR Task-Force, PRISM supports the implementation of the EU SSR policy, and in particular to: i) analyse the partner country's security sector; ii) support the development of country-specific EU strategies for SSR support and design appropriate SSR support actions, including CBSD; iii) engage in partnerships with the UN and relevant regional actors.

To provide responsive, flexible and effective expertise for emerging needs in countries undergoing security sector reform and transformation, an **EU Security Sector Governance Facility** has recently been launched. This will allow the mobilisation at short notice of additional experts for specific operational activities in support of EU delegations.

PRISM has so far been part of integrated Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions to Mali, Somalia, Georgia and the Gambia, in support of these countries' authorities and security forces in strengthening accountability and professionalism. In Mali, Somalia and Georgia these inter-service missions launched the development of "SSR coordination matrices", which are strategic documents developed jointly by all EU actors, in which they define common objectives, identify political dialogue, cooperation and possible CSDP actions necessary to achieve them, together with the required synergies, complementarities and sequencing.

In the Gambia, a joint UN-EU-ECOWAS mission carried out a shared assessment of the Gambian security sector, defined common objectives and opportunities for action for each of the organisation and collaboration mechanisms. The UN, EU and ECOWAS are now fully coordinating their political dialogue and actions to support an inclusive SSR in the country.

To conclude, the establishment of PRISM division as foreseen in the EU Global Strategy aims at enhancing an EU coordinated response to crises and ensuring its operationalisation. At the same time, PRISM should be seen as a facilitator for the provision of tools and expertise to other divisions, particularly to geographic and thematic desks, to EUDELS, and the rest of the CSDP family, as well as the European Commission and EU Members States. One year on, the growing number of requests for support is an encouraging portent for the role PRISM can play in contributing to a more effective and integrated EU response to conflicts and crises. ■



*Mr Stefano Tomat
Head of Division
and staff at the
PRISM stand
on EU Open Day
05 May 2018*

EU Special Operations Forces, a standing, flexible tool for the CSDP

LT COL FRANCOIS BLACHE - ACTION OFFICER, EUMS OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE



Finnish SOF participating in a maritime 'hijacking of a civilian ferry' exercise.



In October 2017, the 13th EU Special Operations Forces (SOF) Seminar organised by the Finnish Defence Ministry took place at the National Defence University in Helsinki, bringing together more than 70 representatives from 21 nations. One of the oldest of all CSDP events, the 2017 iteration afforded an excellent opportunity to discuss the issue of the integration of SOF and national authorities against hybrid threats and terrorism. In the course of the 2.5 days event, the Finnish hosts presented a series of very interesting examples of how Finland is adapting both its military and civilian assets in order to face the changing security environment.

To refresh memories, EU SOF is not only a concept but also an operational reality. Since the 2000s, either in executive or non-executive missions, SOF detachments have been deployed to many CSDP operations. From the first military operations in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 to EUFOR Chad in 2008

and EUFOR CAR in 2014, including EU Naval Operations and some EU Training Missions, SOF units of all sizes, embedded or with a dedicated SOF C2 structure, have regularly served under the EU flag.

EU SOF units are capable of conducting full-spectrum operations across the operational continuum but so far when deployed under the EU flag, EU SOF elements have mostly been used in Special Reconnaissance missions, to “shape” the environment for the benefit of the Operations Commanders or in a Faction Liaison role to increase the situational awareness of the decision makers. In some instances, they have also participated in Military Assistance missions as part of the manning of EUTM missions but not under a dedicated SOF C2 construct.

As for the future, following recent events in Europe and elsewhere, the current trend for EU SOF points towards the reinforcement of interagency work, the consolidation of Special Operations Commands, the development of dedicated SOF air and aviation components and a recognition that today’s complex battlefields require a subtle mix of operators, enablers and support elements. In these fields as in many others, the networking opportunities offered by the EU SOF seminar enable the analysis, comparison and exchange as to what works and what does not.

In this context and banking on the renewed EU-NATO convergence of the past months, the 2018 EU SOF Seminar will exceptionally and for the first time merge with the NATO SOF Conference. This joint SOF conference is scheduled to take place in Madrid from 25 to 27 September under the auspices of the Spanish CHOD. ■

Delegates at the 2017 Helsinki EU SOF Seminar.



Note: Missions/Operations in **bold** are ongoing. Dates refer to agreed mandates and do not mean that missions/operations will necessarily close on dates indicated. Information correct at time of print 30 Apr 2018.

EU Missions and Operations

Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 34 missions and operations under CSDP. 12 are military operations/missions. The remainder are civilian missions. Currently, the EU is undertaking 16 missions and operations under CSDP (6 military missions and operations and 10 civilian missions).

Operations	MILITARY MISSIONS	CIVILIAN MISSIONS
MIDDLE EAST	-	<p>EJUST LEX-Iraq (Iraq), Mar 05 - Dec 13</p> <p>EUPOL - COPPS (occupied Palestinian territories), Jan 06 - 30 Jun 18</p> <p>EUBAM Rafah (occupied Palestinian territories), 25 Nov 05 - 30 Jun 18</p> <p>EUAM Iraq 16 Oct 17 - 16 Oct 18</p>
EUROPE	<p>CONCORDIA (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Mar - Dec 03</p> <p>EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Maintain Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) and conduct capacity building of AFBiH, Dec 04 - Nov 18</p> <p>EUNAVFOR MED – Operation SOPHIA. Contribute to disrupting the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. Training and monitoring of the Libyan coastguard and prevention of arms smuggling, Jul 17 - Dec 18.</p>	<p>EUPOL Proxima (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Dec 03 - Dec 05</p> <p>EUPAT (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) followed EUPOL Proxima, Dec 05 – Jun 06</p> <p>EUPM BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jan 03 - Jun 12</p> <p>EJUST Themis (Georgia), Jul 04 - Jul 05</p> <p>EUPT Kosovo, Apr 06 - Feb 08</p> <p>EULEX Kosovo, 04 Feb 08 - 14 Jun 18</p> <p>EUMM Georgia, 15 Sep 08 - 14 Dec 18</p> <p>EUAM Ukraine, 22 Jul 14 - 30 November 17</p>
ASIA	-	<p>AMM (Aceh Province, Indonesia), Sep 05 - Dec 06</p> <p>EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (Afghanistan), 12 Jun 07 - 31 Dec 16</p>
AFRICA	<p>ARTEMIS (Ituri province, Congo RDC), Jun – Sep 03</p> <p>EUFOR RD Congo (Congo RDC), Jun – Nov 06</p> <p>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad-Central African Republic), Jan 08 – Mar 09</p> <p>EUFOR RCA (Central African Republic) Apr 2014 - Mar 2015</p> <p>EUMAM RCA Mar 2015 – Jul 2016</p> <p>Operation ATALANTA (EUNAVFOR Somalia Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia) Dec 08 – Dec 18</p> <p>EUTM Somalia (Training Mission, Somalia), Apr 10 - Dec 18</p> <p>EUTM Mali (Training Mission, Mali), Feb 13 - May 18</p> <p>EUTM RCA (Central African Republic, Africa) July 16 - Sep 18</p>	<p>EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo RDC), Apr 05 - Jun 07</p> <p>EU SSR (Guinea-Bissau), Jun 08 - Sep 10</p> <p>AMIS 11 Support, Darfur Province (Sudan), Jul 05 - Dec 07</p> <p>EUVASEC South Sudan, Sep 12 - Jan 14</p> <p>EUCAP SOMALIA, Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, 01 Jul 12 – 31 Dec 18</p> <p>EUPOL RD Congo (Congo RDC), 01 Jul 07 - 30 Sep 14</p> <p>EUCAP Sahel Niger 15 Jul 12 - 15 Jul 18</p> <p>EUCAP Sahel Mali 15 Jan 15 – 14 Jan 19</p> <p>EUBAM LIBYA 22 May 13 – 21 August 17</p>

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

EU BAM RAFAH

TYPE	EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point.
OBJECTIVES	To provide a “Third Party” presence at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) on the Gaza-Egypt border mandated to monitor, verify and evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) border police and customs services at the RCP and to contribute to confidence building between Israel and the PA.
MANDATE	Operational phase began on 25 November 2005. However, operations at the RCP have been suspended since June 2007 due to Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip. The Mission has maintained its readiness and capacity to redeploy to the RCP once political and security conditions allow. It supports capacity building of the PA’s border agency to enhance their preparedness to return to the RCP. The Mission mandate runs until 30 June 2018.
COMMITMENT	The authorised strength of the Mission is 16, as well as 1 visiting expert and 1 crisis response team staff. The budget for the period from July 2017 to June 2018 is € 1.98 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	Guenther FREISLEBEN (DE).

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

EUPOL COPPS

TYPE	EU Police and Rule of Law Mission.
OBJECTIVES	To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing and wider criminal justice arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the EU’s institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector and Criminal Justice Reform.
MANDATE	Launched on 1 January 2006, the current Mission mandate runs until 30 June 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Ramallah, the Mission has an authorised strength of 114 staff. Mission members include police experts, judges, and prosecutors. The budget for the period from July 2017 to June 2018 is €12.3 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	Kauko AALTONMAA (FI).



IRAQ EUAM IRAQ



TYPE	EU Advisory Mission in support of SSR in Iraq (EUAM Iraq).
OBJECTIVES	EUAM Iraq focuses on assisting the Iraqi authorities in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Iraqi security strategy. EU experts provide advice and assistance in priority work areas responding to the needs of the relevant authorities, assist the EU Delegation in the coordination of EU and Member States actions in this sector and also to assess potential further EU engagement in the Security Sector Reform in the long term in the context of the future EU policy towards Iraq.
MANDATE	Launched 16 October 2017, current mandate for one year.
COMMITMENT	Authorised 51 staff (36 EU and 15 national). The budget October 2017 – October 2018 is €14 m.
HEAD OF MISSION	Dr. Markus RITTER (DE)



GEORGIA EUMM GEORGIA



TYPE	EU Civilian Monitoring Mission
OBJECTIVES	Following the August 2008 armed conflict in Georgia, EUMM provides civilian monitoring of parties' actions, including full compliance with the EU-brokered Six Point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures on a countrywide basis throughout Georgia, including South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, working in close coordination with partners particularly the UN/OSCE and coherent with other EU activity, in order to contribute to stabilisation, normalization and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia.
MANDATE	Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission's current mandate runs to 14 December 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi. The Mission has an authorised strength of 411. The budget for the period December 2017 to December 2018 is € 19.9 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	Erik HOEEG (DK).



BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA EUFOR OPERATION ALTHEA



TYPE	EU- led Military operation, (European Union Force).
OBJECTIVES	Under the authority of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2384, EUFOR supports Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BiH) efforts to maintain a safe and secure environment (SASE). It also conducts capacity building and training of the Armed Forces of BiH in order to contribute to peace and stability.
MANDATE	EUFOR took over responsibility of maintaining a SASE in BiH in 2004 from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Operation ALTHEA is a United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mission.
COMMITMENT	The Operation had been reconfigured by September 2012 to conduct capacity building and training in addition to the executive mandate. EUFOR Operation ALTHEA comprises of 600 personnel from 13 EU-member states and 5 partner Troop Contributing Nations. The in-theatre troops can be reinforced by Intermediate Reserve Forces and stand ready to respond to any security challenge.
HEAD OF MISSION	Major General Martin DORFER (AT) is the Force Commander (COMEUFOR) for EUFOR Op ALTHEA. The Operation is conducted under Berlin+ arrangements with the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) acting as the EU Operational HQ. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), General Sir James EVERARD (UK) , is the EU Operation Commander.



CENTRAL SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN EUNAVFOR MED



TYPE	EUNAVFOR Med Operation SOPHIA (ENFM) is a military crisis management operation that is contributing to improving maritime security in the Central Mediterranean and supporting the return of stability and security in Libya.
OBJECTIVES	ENFM is a multifaceted naval operation instrumental in returning stability to the Central Mediterranean (following the 2015 migration crisis) through contributing to disrupting human trafficking activities, implementing the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, gathering information in relation to illegal trafficking including oil smuggling, as well as training and monitoring of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy (LCG&N). ENFM's contribution to the exchange of information with EU, UN, international and national agencies and organisations, including NGO, and other CSDP missions and operations remain a key enabler for the Operation. The operation is but one element of the EU's wider comprehensive approach to migration and Libya complementing wider EU actions in the region.
MANDATE	ENFM is operating in accordance with the political, strategic and politico-military objectives set out in order to contribute disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean.
COMMITMENT	The flagship is the Italian Ship "San Giusto", with an average of 4 surface units and 6 air assets deployed, subject to change in accordance with Member States contributions. The mission has a total of 1200 personnel with 890 in force elements and 27 participating Member States. The expected common budget from Jul 17 to Dec 18 is EURO 6.0 million. Additional support is provided by EU, international and NGO organisations including FRONTEX, EASO, UNSMIL, UNHCR, IOM, CISOM and the RAVA IT foundation.
HEAD OF MISSION	The EU Operation Headquarters is located in Rome (Italy), Rear Admiral (UH) Enrico CREDENDINO (IT Navy) is the Operation Commander with Rear Admiral (LH) Alberto MAFFEIS (IT Navy) as the Force Commander at sea.



UKRAINE EUAM UKRAINE



TYPE	EU Advisory Mission for civilian security sector reform
OBJECTIVES	To assist the Ukrainian authorities towards a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector through strategic advice and hands-on support for specific reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights. The goal is to achieve a civilian security sector that is efficient, accountable, and enjoys the trust of the public.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 22 July 2014 and its current mandate is until 31 May 2019.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Kyiv with regional presences in Lviv and Kharkiv as well as mobile outreach to other regions. The Mission has an authorised strength of 289 staff. A budget of €31.9 million is allocated for the period from December 2017 to May 2019.
HEAD OF MISSION	Kestutis LANCINSKAS (LT).




KOSOVO EULEX KOSOVO



TYPE	EU Rule of Law Mission.
OBJECTIVES	As the largest civilian Mission launched under the CSDP, EULEX Kosovo's task is to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence.
MANDATE	Launched on 4 February 2008, the Mission's current mandate runs until 14 June 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Pristina, the Mission has an authorised strength of 800 staff. EU Member States and five Third State contributors Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA and Canada also support the Mission. A budget of €49.6 million is allocated for the budget period from June 2017 to June 2018.
HEAD OF MISSION	Alexandra PAPAPOULOU (EL)

 NIGER EUCAP SAHEL 	
TYPE	EU Capacity Building Mission.
OBJECTIVES	Through training and advising, the Mission aims to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces (Gendarmerie, National Police, National Guard) to fight terrorism and organised crime as well as better control irregular migration flows in an effective and coordinated manner, with a view to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel region.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 15 July 2012 and the current mandate runs until 15 July 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquarters in Niamey and Field Office in Agadez. Authorised 192 staff. An annual budget of € 31 million was allocated for the period from July 2017 to July 2018.
ACTING HEAD OF MISSION	Antje PITTELKAU (DE).

 MALI EUCAP SAHEL 	
TYPE	EU Capacity Building Mission
OBJECTIVES	The Mission supports the restructuring of the Malian internal security forces (the Police Nationale, Gendarmerie Nationale and Garde Nationale) with a view to helping Malian authorities implement their Security Sector Reform through a combination of training activities and the provision of strategic advice. In this, it complements the work of the EU Military Training Mission.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 15 January 2015 and its current mandate runs until 14 January 2019.
COMMITMENT	The headquarters of the Mission is in Bamako. The authorised strength is 203 staff. The annual budget for the period from January 2018 to January 2019 is €28.4 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	Philippe RIO (FR).

 G5 SAHEL Regional Coordinating Cell (RCC) 	
TYPE	CSDP scoping and planning regional activity (Please note, that this is not a CSDP mission, but a CSDP action, embedded within a specific mission, but with a wider geographical area of responsibility and a more encompassing mandate.)
OBJECTIVES	Embedded within EUCAP Sahel Mali, this CSDP action primarily supports cross-border cooperation. To this end it will examine possible enhancements of regional cooperation structures and foresee any possible CSDP support to cross-border cooperation capacities amongst the five members of the G5 Sahel (Mauritania, Niger, Burkina-Faso, Mali and Chad)
MANDATE	Launched 20 June 2017, current mandate until 14 January 2019.
COMMITMENT	Authorised 15 staff. The regionalisation's expenditures are covered under EUCAP Sahel Mali's budget.
HEAD	Natalina CEA (IT)

 MALI EU TRAINING MISSION, MALI (EUTM MALI) 	
TYPE	Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF).
OBJECTIVES	In line with the "EU Strategy for Development and Security in the SAHEL", EUTM aims to support the training and reorganisation of the MaAF and to help improve its military capacity, in order to allow, under civilian authority, the restoration of the country's territorial integrity. More than 12,000 personnel have been trained by EUTM Mali. The mission also supports the implementation of the structural reforms encompassed in the Defence Programming Law ("Loi de programmation militaire - LOPM) and supports the MaAF in the establishment of the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) Joint Forces.
MANDATE	Launched on 18 February 2013 and initially planned for 15 months, the mission was initially extended to May 2016 and then to May 2018. A planning process is currently ongoing to extend the mandate for another 2 years. EUTM Mali is not involved in combat operations or mentoring. Its actions extend up to the river Niger Loop, including Gao and Timbuktu.
COMMITMENT	The mission comprises 570 personnel including 200 instructors, mission support staff, Force Protection and Air MEDEVAC (in total 21 EU contributing states + 4 non EU). The Mission Headquarters is located in Bamako and the main Training area is in Koulikoro, 60 km north-east of the capital. Common costs for the current mandate are estimated at €39 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	The Director MPCC, Lt Gen Esa PULKKINEN is the Operational Commander located in Brussels. Brigadier General Enrique MILLÁN (ESP) is the EU Mission Force Commander, from February to November 2018. Commander.

 LIBYA EUBAM LIBYA 	
TYPE	EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya
OBJECTIVES	EUBAM Libya will assist in a comprehensive civilian security sector reform planning process, with a view to preparing for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission' with the task to 'inform EU planning for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission in the field of security sector reform, co-operating closely with, and contributing to, UNSMIL efforts, liaising with the legitimate Libyan authorities and other relevant security interlocutors.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 22 May 2013 and has a mandate until 31 December 2018. The Mission was temporarily relocated to Tunis on 31st July 2014. Current authorised staff is 23.
COMMITMENT	The Mission operates from its Headquarters in Tunis. The budget for the period from August 2017 to December 2018 is €31.2 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	Vincenzo TAGLIAFERRI (IT).

GLOBAL MEMO

 HORN OF AFRICA AND THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN EUCAP SOMALIA 	
TYPE	Capacity Building Mission.
OBJECTIVES	The Mission aims to strengthen the maritime security capacity of host countries to effectively govern their territorial waters and to ensure maritime security. The Mission's efforts in Somalia concentrate on mentoring and advising Somali partners. This strategic level advice and mentoring is supported by the coordination and facilitation of specialised training to support capacity building efforts. The Mission is complementary to Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia.
MANDATE	Launched in July 2012, the current mandate runs until 31 December 2018.
COMMITMENT	The mission has its headquarters in Mogadishu with an administrative back office in Nairobi and field offices in Somaliland (Hargeisa) and Puntland (Garowe). Authorised strength is 165, with 87 currently deployed. The budget allocated for the period from March 2018 to December 2018 is €27 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	Maria-Cristina STEPANESCU (RO) .

 SOMALIA EU TRAINING Mission, Somalia (EUTM Somalia) 	
TYPE	Military mission to contribute to the training, mentoring and advice of the Somali National Army Forces (SNAF)
OBJECTIVES	On 12 Dec 2016, the Council adopted the decision on a 4th mandate with the objective of providing political and strategic level military advice and mentoring to Somali authorities within the Defence Institutions, mainly specialised training as well as specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain, in order to contribute to the development of Somali National Security Forces.
MANDATE	The current mandate commenced on 01 Jan 2017 and expires in Dec 2018. A planning process is ongoing to extend the mandate for another two years. In accordance with the Strategic Review of CSDP, Engagement in Somalia and HoA. EUTM-Somalia shall not be involved in combat operations.
COMMITMENT	The mission comprises currently 184 personnel from 9 Member States and 1 participating third state (Serbia) + 15 local staff. The approved budget for the 2017 was 13.5 M€. Since January 2014 all EUTM-Somalia activities including advisory, mentoring and training are now carried out in Mogadishu with the support of a Liaison Office in Nairobi and a Support Cell in Brussels.
HEAD OF MISSION	The Director MPCC, Lt Gen Esa PULKKINEN is the Operational Commander located in Brussels. The Mission Headquarters is situated in Mogadishu. Brigadier General Pietro ADDIS (IT) is the EU Mission Force Commander since 01 July 2017.

 SOMALIA Operation ATALANTA – EUNAVFOR Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia 	
TYPE	Maritime counter-piracy operation.
OBJECTIVES	In support of UN Security Council Resolutions calling for active participation in the fight against piracy. The areas of operation are the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. The operation mandate is to; protect vulnerable shipping and vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; support other EU missions, institutions and instruments within Somalia and contribute to the EU Integrated Approach and to contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and report this activity to DG MARE, the EU Commission department responsible for EU policy on maritime affairs and fisheries.
MANDATE	Launched on 8 Dec 2008 the current mandate expires in Dec 2018. In Nov 2017 the Strategic Review and Military Advice recommended that the mandate be extended to Dec 2020.
COMMITMENT	Subject to Military Force Flow and the Force Generation process, Operation ATALANTA typically consists of between 1 to 3 surface combat vessels and up to 2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft with a current strength of 800 personnel from 19 EU contributing states and 2 non-EU states.
HEAD OF OPERATION	The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Northwood (UK). Major General Charlie STICKLAND OBE (UK) is the EU Operation Commander. Rear Admiral Simone MALVAGNA (IT) is the Force Commander.

 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC EUTM RCA (MILITARY TRAINING MISSION) 	
TYPE	EU CSDP Military Training Mission
OBJECTIVES	EUTM RCA is part of the EU's comprehensive approach in the Central African Republic. This approach aims to contribute to the African and wider international efforts to restore stability and support the political transition process in the country. EUTM RCA follows the EU Military Advisory Mission in CAR (EUMAM RCA).
MANDATE	Launched on 16 Jul 2016, two years after achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC), its mandate expires on 20 Sep 18. A planning process is currently ongoing to extend the mandate for another 2 years.
COMMITMENT	In order to contribute to the Defence Sector Reform in CAR within the Central African Security Sector Reform process coordinated by MINUSCA, and working towards the goal of modernised, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA), EUTM RCA provides strategic advice to CAR's Ministry of Defense and Military Staff, education to the FACA's commissioned and non-commissioned officers and specialists, and operational training to the FACA. It also coordinates closely with the EU Delegation in Bangui.
HEAD OF MISSION	The Director MPCC, Lt Gen Esa PULKKINEN is the Operational Commander located in Brussels. The EU Mission Headquarters is located in Bangui. The EU Mission Force Commander is Brig Gen Hermínio Teodoro MAIO (PT)

EUMS Logistic Conference 2017 and The Way Ahead

BY CDR ANDRZEJ CZSKAJ – ACTION OFFICER, POLICY BRANCH, EUMS LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE

The annual EU Military Staff Logistic Conference was held on 18-19 September 2017 in the Belgian Military Academy, BRUSSELS. The guiding 'leitmotif' of the conference was "Building logistic capabilities - opportunities and challenges", concentrating the discussion on the new logistic challenges posed by the Level of Ambition (LoA) as defined in the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) "Shared vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe" and following the "Implementation Plan on Security and Defence". The aim of the conference was to improve the quality and efficiency of the logistic support provided to EU-led military operations and missions through enhancing the relationships within the European Union, with external partners and through sharing information with stakeholders involved in specific areas for further collaboration on Logistics.

Many years have passed since the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003) was published and the EU Capabilities Requirement Catalogue 2005 (RC05) was defined. Therefore, with the 2016 launch of the European Union Global Strategy the process of capability requirements adaptation was initiated. Subsequently, the requirements for logistic capabilities have been revised and adapted to meet current and future challenges. It is widely acknowledged that no single MS has the capacity to face all the challenges on its own. Furthermore, national defence budgets are under pressure and investment with minimal interruptions has arguably been in steady decline, while costs of high technology defence systems and the level of their complexity are persistently rising. For these reasons, the most obvious solution is to acquire and maintain the most demanding capabilities for EU MS through cooperation, either in a regional or alliance context. Investigating potential areas of logistic collaboration including the exploration of new ideas and mechanisms and developing the most promising ones may increase the operational effectivity as well as the cost efficiency of missions and operations.

In attendance were 19 EU Member States and 12 organisations including EEAS/CPCC, EU MPCC, Athena Mechanism Administration, EDA, MCCE, EATC, MLCC, FRONTEX, EUROCORPS, EL EU OHQ, NATO - I-SJLSG and US EU-COM. The feedback from the participants was very positive especially concerning the comprehensive briefs received from the EATC and MCCE which demonstrated examples of the better use of limited transportation resources, as well as a description of Mobility Strategy presented by US EUCOM and opportunities for common training and the advantages of multinational logistic cooperation introduced by MLCC. Also positively received were logistic experiences from EUTM RCA which identified some practical issues directly from



DDG EUMS opening the Logistic Conference (left to right: Col Eric Renaut, BG Dionigi Loria, MGen Giovanni Manione, DDG EUMS, Col Pedro Jooren, Col Georg Podlipny)

the field, such as the lack of civilian companies in the region capable of supplying the required logistical services for the EU Forces.

It was recognised by all participants that multinational logistic capabilities are highly dependent on real standardisation and interoperability. Thus in order to enhance logistic cooperation priority should be given to:

- ▶ The freedom of controlled movement of troops across borders. This is a major challenge in building common logistics. When achieved within Europe it could facilitate the transport of forces and minimise response times in crises, emergencies and contingencies.
- ▶ The harmonisation of national regulations and full implementation of STANAGs for EU missions and operations was acknowledged as another aspect of standardisation that would lead to improved performance of logistic support. It was considered that a top-down approach could be fostered by the EU at the political level.
- ▶ An integrated, comprehensive approach in the conduct of CSDP military operations and civilian missions within the same or close areas of operations. As the logistic challenges are virtually identical for both, shared logistical plans and processes could deliver synergies through streamlined processes and economies of scale. The benefits of integrated logistics solutions would indisputably lead to greater efficiency and reduced running costs for missions. This would need to be balanced against the need to keep civilian and military command and control structures as well as funding resources properly demarcated. Therefore, it was concluded that this issue would require further study in order to develop the methodologies and tools to deliver solutions which would enable greater cooperation and use of shared logistics resources, capabilities and contracts.

This topic will form the main theme of the 2018, EUMS Logistic Conference scheduled for 05-06 June 2018. ■

The European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA)

BY LT COL TORSTEN STEPHAN – MEDIA AFFAIRS OFFICER EUROCORPS

Origins of the EUTM RCA mission

2003 saw the beginnings of the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since then, the country has experienced several changes of government. More recently the International Community sought to assist in restoring stability, e.g. through the 2013, French SANGARIS operation. Simultaneously, the African Union (AU) established a political mission in support of CAR. Despite the intervention of foreign troops, the situation continued to be chaotic and a transitional government was set up in 2014 to conduct free and democratic general elections under the auspices of the international community. At that moment, the European Union (EU) decided to launch a military peacekeeping mission, EUFOR RCA, focused on protecting the population in the capital, Bangui, and its surroundings. The UN subsumed the AU mission, transitioning into the MINUSCA (Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic) peacekeeping mission comprising a force of 10,000 soldiers and 2,000 policemen. Following the experience of the MINUSCA Force, the EU decided to pursue a similar approach and EUFOR RCA transitioned into a military advisory mission (EUMAM RCA).

On being elected President of CAR, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, invited the EU to again deploy a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSPD) military training mission. This structure, similar to that already established in Mali is known as the CAR European Union Training Mission (EUTM RCA). This new mission was launched in July 2016, utilising personnel seconded by the Member States (MS) from the EUROCORPS Headquarters. The EUTM RCA mission mandate states that, in close coordination and as a complement to the action of MINUSCA, EUTM RCA will support the Government of the Central African Republic in implementing the Security Sector Reform (SSR), especially with regard to the reform of the Defence Sector, by assisting the Central African Armed Forces (FACA). Its objective is to support the creation of a modern, effective, ethnically balanced and democratically responsible FACA. EUTM RCA activities are focused on the Bangui area.

‘EUROCORPS’ deployment in CAR

From the start of the EUTM RCA mission in Bangui, EUROCORPS seconded personnel were thoroughly involved in the planning and the conduct of this operation. Upon au-

thorisation by the EUROCORPS participating MS, EUROCORPS personnel constituted the core (60 personnel out of 170) of the EUTM RCA mission, and also three subsequent Mission Force Commanders (MFCdr), namely Major General Eric Hauteclouque-Raysz (FR), Brigadier General Hermann Ruys (BE) and most recently Major General Fernando Garcia Blazquez (ES). The EUROCORPS seconded core personnel provided tangible benefits to the mission with their experience of working together and unit cohesion providing the nucleus of a ‘worked up’ HQ which enabled full operational capability (FOC) to be achieved by Sep 2016. The EUTM RCA mission is divided into a General Headquarters and three main pillars: The Strategic Advice pillar, the Operational Training pillar and Education pillar.

The Mission’s General Headquarters

By performing their usual tasks of planning and providing advice, the general staff serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, they are responsible for coordinating the mission’s three pillars. On the other, they link the tactical level with the newly created Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) of the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

The Strategic Advice Pillar (SAP)

The mission of this pillar is to provide strategic advice to the Ministry of Defence and FACA’s Joint Staff.

Eight thematic groups carry out advisory work. Each group comprises Central African Republic officials and one or more SAP pillar experts. The groups are mainly concerned with drafting and/or updating regulations necessary for reorganising CAR’s Ministry of Defence and FACA in order to achieve maximum efficiency in the management of its resources and operational capability. Within the first eighteen months, EUTM RCA had drafted and coordinated 80% per cent of the documents identified in line with the MINUSCA, CAR and EU Roadmap for CAR defence policy.

The Operational Training Pillar (OTP)

The EUTM RCA Mission Plan had foreseen a requirement, during the Mission’s first mandate (September 2016 to September 2018) - to train up to three (3) FACA Territorial Infantry Battalions (BITs).

CAR military units were trained during a six-month period.

Training started with the soldiers' individual training with collective training at section, platoon and company levels culminating at Battalion level. . At the same time, FACA staffs and combat support arms were trained. Additional training was provided in the fields of reconnaissance, patrolling and area control missions. The following characteristics of the training provided must be emphasized:

- Training is tailored to the preexisting Battalions of FACA.
- The objective of this training is to enable the operational deployment of military units in order to ensure the security of the population and reassert the States' authority where the Government has little or no effective control or presence.
- Training content is based on the possible tasks that the Central African Units will perform when they are deployed. It is focused on Presence and Zone Control Missions.

So far EUTM RCA has successfully trained two BITs, with a third in training since January 2018, and on completion, circa summer of 2018; the objective of the first mandate will have been reached. Besides educating and training battalion-type units, the OTP Pillar also trains former mercenaries and irregular combatants. These are drawn from armed groups scattered throughout the country and have gone through a process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). They undergo a 12-week individual training designed to fully reintegrate them into FACA units. Their training is carried out by EUTM-trained FACA instructors who are monitored by EUTM personnel.

The CAR government has also requested EUTM to evaluate and validate FACA units (special operations, paratroopers, engineers, intelligence and protection of authorities, etc.) trained by other African countries under bilateral agreements.

The Education Pillar (EDP)

This pillar is responsible for supporting the Central African military authorities in the development of a military education system geared towards commissioned and non-commissioned officers including specialist personnel. The components of the Education Pillar fulfill their tasks in three main areas:

- ▶ Formation of a local pool of qualified teachers and instructors. Considered as the main effort of the education pillar, the desired end state of the EUTM mandate is that FACA will develop its own sustainable training system. In this context, the main tasks are:
 - Develop training courses designed to provide FACA instructors with different skills (such as tactical field firing, topography or international humanitarian law).
 - Conduct refresher courses for instructors trained by former EUTM rotations or the EUMAM mission.
- ▶ Develop quick impact courses. Quick impact courses frequently focus on OTP-trained units.
- ▶ Prepare a catalogue of courses. Course programmes comprising a total of thirty (30) specialist courses and twenty (20) qualification courses are being prepared in detail and will be progressively transferred to the military education system.

EUROCORPS' and EUTM's main achievements in CAR

Seconded EUROCORPS personnel have contributed very significantly to EUTM RCA. The provision of core ready 'worked



The Core' – EUROCORPS Personnel seconded to EUTM RCA including MFCdr Maj Gen Blazquez

up' Mission HQs, not forgetting MFCdrs over three rotations enabled the rapid deployment and attainment of FOC in a short timeframe and ensured the effective coordination and delivery of training and support to FACA under the three pillars.

EUTM RCA maintained excellent relations with international organisations such as MINUSCA, the UN, EUDEL, the AU and other external actors including the CAR government.

The reinforcement of EU capacity building in support of security and development (EU CBSD) programmes through UN, foreign government organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGO) involvement is an important and necessary part of this solution.

EUTM has participated in many initiatives for the benefit of FACA servicemen's families and the population in general, e.g. support was provided, to children's health care campaigns and for development projects in support of the CAR youth. The friendly relationship established with FACA and the warm embracing by local authorities of EUTM initiatives, have promoted the three-tiered projects that balance EUTM, FACA, and CAR civil society-based approaches. All of the above has once more improved and consolidated the good image of the EUTM RCA mission.

Possible evolution of the mission

It is desirable that CAR will be in a position to self-sufficiently and autonomously manage itself and all its sectors. The EUTM RCA security sector objective is designed to foster an evolution that would balance the current main effort of training FACA with another one that will prioritise the pillar of strategic advice and mentoring, enabling FACA assume the lead and main responsibilities with EUTM in a supporting role.

That is why, at this moment in time, it is essential, to ensure that the main effort will be on training capable and professional military personnel and the implementation of the Train the Trainers concept thus ensuring FACA's future autonomy and self-sufficiency.

The work to be done remains arduous and nobody should expect short-term results. But it is essential to maintain the momentum of the mission, harnessing the good image and reputation of the EU amongst both locals and international actors. For this, it is vital that that the EUTM RCA contributing nations maintain the interest, hope and constancy necessary to help solve the crisis in the Central African Republic. ■

EU participation in NATO's flagship Cyber Defence Exercise

BY MAJ LEVENTE SZABO - ACTION OFFICER, EUMS CIS DIRECTORATE AND MEMBER OF THE CYBER DEFENCE TEAM.



When we wake up and look at the morning news, we should not be surprised anymore to find a cyber security related incident being broadly discussed and commented on (sometimes even through presidential tweets). Even though the majority of the population probably still has no direct grasp as to what exactly is happening in the context of a cyberattack, the results and the implications are quite easy to understand and can be dramatic and frightening, especially if vital utilities are hit, such as the electrical grid or the water supply system. Even more so in the military domain, the success of a mission or operation may greatly depend on the reliability of the assets at the disposal of the commander to achieve his/her goals and objectives, especially in a contested cyber environment.

The continuous rise of the cyber threat level has resulted in a set of actions from both the EU and NATO in order to mitigate the risk of being attacked and augment their capabilities to respond. As most EU member states are also part of NATO, the two organisations share a lot of common assets and capabilities, and there is an ever growing need for cooperation in various fields, such as cyber security and defence. This is clearly illustrated by the EU-NATO Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw in 2016, which highlights five areas of cooperation in this field: the; exchange of cyber defence related concepts, harmonisation of training requirements, fostering of cyber defence innovation cooperation, strengthening cooperation in cyber defence exercises and exchanging cyber related best practices amongst staffs.

In practical terms this cooperation is orchestrated by the EU Military Staff CIS Directorate (EUMS CISD) Cyber Defence team (CDT) amongst others.

The Cyber Coalition exercise

Cyber Coalition is NATO's annual cyber defence exercise, planned and conducted by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) under



the governance of the Military Committee (MC). The intent of the exercise is to exercise specific Cyber Defence objectives which encompass technical and non-technical coordination aspects to better understand current capabilities, functionality and improve NATO wide Cyber Defence posture together with partners, such as the European Union.

The Cyber Coalition exercise generally involves a simulated scenario with a deployed NATO stabilisation force (NISFOR¹) being impacted by cyber-attacks that trigger technical challenges to be solved by the respective cyber defence teams of the participating nations and entities, but also in cooperation within the Alliance and any partners present.

The EEAS (through the EU Military Staff) has attended Cyber Coalition since 2015 in an observer role, but 2017 marked the first official EEAS participation in the exercise. This was a major change compared to previous years in the exercise conduct, since the EU participation was established through CERT-EU², a civilian entity, with the EU Military Staff acting as a coordinator for the EU-side engagement. CERT-EU has a technical agreement with NATO's main cyber defence entity, NCIRC³ since 2016, which was established in order to facilitate increased information sharing between the two entities.

EU Participation on CC17

The initial challenge in terms of integrating CERT-EU into the exercise construct was overcome by creating a sim-

1. NATO International Stabilization Force

2. EU Computer Emergency Response Team

3. NATO Computer Incident Response Capability

ulated EU civilian mission in the NISFOR mission area, with an operational level agreement with CERT-EU for the provision of cyber security services. In turn, this civilian mission was impacted by the same threats as the NISFOR mission participants. (This actually led to interesting experiences, such as the technical teams discovering the mission data centre to be capable of providing radar functionalities as well, a small flaw in the implementation of the technical challenges)

Nevertheless, the EU exercise goal was definitely achieved in the sense that NCIRC and CERT-EU actively communicated threat information within the boundaries of their technical agreement and were able to work together in trying to solve a common incident (as both the NISFOR mission – for which NCIRC had overall responsibility – and the EU civilian mission were impacted by the same threat vectors).

It would be a bit ambitious to say that this information exchange would happen in exactly the same fashion if a similar real-time situation were to occur tomorrow, however there is a definite appetite for an increased sharing of information by both parties.

Difficulties in information sharing

Although the Cyber Coalition 2017 scenario was quite specific to a NATO mission outside of the EU/NATO territories and a bit far-fetched to effectively exercise the full spectrum of information sharing capabilities between CERT-EU and NCIRC, it afforded a very good opportunity to pinpoint the potential difficulties in establishing effective cooperation in the future.

Firstly, even though both parties had assets in the mission area (obviously NATO had a significantly larger presence), neither party had any indication initially that the other had been attacked. This was partially due to the nature of the threat, targeted at the individual participating nations. Thus NCIRC needed a longer period of time to be involved in the incident handling and to realise that multiple incidents were connected to the same threat, but it was also due to the fact that since there was no direct indication of any external parties being affected, no communication needs arose on their side towards CERT-EU.

Also, NATO generally tends to classify cyber threat information, which either severely limits their capability to share it outside of NATO or the information has to be stripped of certain identifiers before transmission, which potentially limits its usability after receipt. During the CC17 exercise this could be seen in relation to the above mentioned radar-related incident, but it could also be an everyday issue in terms of cyber threats affecting the Alliance's networks.

The overall exercise scenario also contributed to the limited information sharing between CERT-EU and NCIRC that could be observed during the course of the exercise. The deployment of a NATO mission outside of the EU borders would only have initiated a greater information sharing need towards the EU, had there also been EU military assets deployed in/or near the NISFOR mission area, with a mission order enabling cooperation between the two



forces. Nevertheless, this option remains to be explored, as the cyber defence related information flow in this scenario was far from trivial.

Areas to potentially improve

Based on the outcome of the CC17 exercise, it is safe to say that even though the initial objective to exercise information sharing between CERT-EU and NCIRC was achieved, there is still plenty of room for improvement. One such area of potential development is the shared situational awareness amongst the two entities. This obviously comes from an “operational” need to cooperate, due to NATO being affected closer to the European borders, where an EU Member State or agency (such as FRONTEX) could be impacted by the same cyber threat. However, this task may yet prove to be rather challenging, as the technical information is currently shared between NCIRC and the NATO and partner nation military CERTs, whereas CERT-EU is primarily in contact with national civilian CERTs, and nations have their own individual mechanisms for the internal sharing of information between civilian and military entities. Another potential development could be the integration of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) into the exercise construct and explore the realm of EU military – NATO information sharing possibilities and caveats. As the military entities within the EU currently do not host any cyber situational awareness/information sharing capabilities, the establishment and potential growth of the MPCC provides the opportunity to take the first steps towards identifying the concrete needs and development possibilities in the EU cyber defence realm.

Conclusion/Way ahead

Overall, EU participation in NATO's flagship cyber exercise, Cyber Coalition 2017 clearly showed that the growing global cyber threat needs to be tackled collectively in order to be able to prepare, defend and react in the most effective way possible. The cooperation that started between the two organisations is proving beneficial with a lot of potential areas to explore together working towards a safe and secure cyberspace. Continued mutual participation in such exercises will enhance trust and cooperation, essential elements in this very sensitive domain. ■

EUTM MALI

EUTM MALI AIMING TO IMPROVE THE MALIAN ARMY

EUTM Mali, the mission evolves

BY LT COL VICENTE PAYA - PPI OFFICER EUTM MALI

The First Mandate of the Mission EUTM Mali was launched by the European Union on the 17th January 2013 at the request of the Malian Authorities and in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012).

Five years on and today, in April 2018 the Mission is nearing the end of its current Mandate. The planning process for the fourth Mandate seeks to build on the work already completed, to learn from the lessons observed and expand on the successes achieved to date.

To understand how this can be effected it is necessary to understand the evolution of the Mission and its impact on the performance and effectiveness of both the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF) and the MaAF itself. This has to be done from different perspectives taking into account the complexities of the Mission and the different areas of activity: advice, training and education.

During the First Mandate the prime focus concentrated on the tactical training of battle groups, so-called GTIA in the French acronym for Groupement Tactique Interarmes. Five of these GTIA battlegroups were trained. During the Second Mandate, from May 2014 till May 2016, the training of GTIA continued but more specialised courses were added. Over the first two mandates a combined total of 8.000 Malian soldiers were trained.

During this period the EUTM's Advisory Task Force (ATF) provided specialist advisors to coach and advise at the senior levels of the MaAF chain of command in order to upgrade the MaAF's operational competence and capability.

Third Mandate: a wider scope

The Third Mandate commenced in May 2016 and ends on 17 May 2018. Here the focus of the training changed. The objectives of the Mission were defined as improving; the MaAF education capability and leadership, the Command and Control and logistics of the MaAF, establishing the operational cycle and increasing the interoperability of MaAF, especially in relation to the newly formed multinational G5 Sahel Joint Force. The G5 Sahel Joint Force includes staff and combat forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. EUTM Mali is no longer a mission devoted to providing basic training to units and their soldiers. It has evolved, increasing in scope and ambition in order to achieve the desired end state; a more confident, capable and effective MaAF, working in conjunction with its neighbours and international missions to achieve stability, security and peace in the region.

The centralised training in Kulikoro Training Centre (KTC) continues, but this training now goes far beyond the original GTIA training. The variety of courses has increased and focuses more on training Malian instructors with the intent of having a self-sufficient MaAF, properly able to train itself. The primary courses are; Infantry Company (Element Tactiques InterArmes: ETIA), Sniper, Engineer, Mortar, Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), Signals, Counter-IED, Commando, Airbase Protection and Logistics Storekeeper. In addition the 'Train the Trainer's' courses include Medical, TACP, ETIA. All courses conducted by EUTM contain modules relating to C-IED awareness, first aid training and Human Rights. To date writing, almost 12,000 military personnel of MaAF have been trained by EUTM Mali.

During this 3rd Mandate the concept of 'decentralised training' was introduced. This comprises Combined Mobile Advisory Training Teams (CMATTs) that deploy to the Military Regions in the Mission Area of Operations. So far, 11 CMATTs have conducted intense training and advisory programmes across this vast country in Kayes, Sikasso, Kati, Segou, Sevare, Timbuktu and Gao.

*Topographic
TtT course,
Malian NCOs
being trained as
instructors.*



Regarding the Mission's Education pillar, Malian authorities and EUTM Mali are interested in enhancing the leadership capabilities of future MaAF Officers and NCOs, thus ETTF conducts courses for officer cadets in the Malian Inter-Armies Military School at Koulikoro. These courses include basic lessons on International Humanitarian Laws, Gender policies and notably leadership. These actions will be also implemented in the Banankoro NCO's School.

The Advisory Task Force (ATF) has increased both in numbers and responsibilities and it now provides advice to the MaAF both at Regional and Strategic levels. It also includes a G5 Sahel Cell responsible for supporting the G5 Sahel initiative and a Project Cell responsible for developing limited projects to improve the capabilities of the MaAF, mainly in the areas of medical support and CIS.

Other equally important activities are those related to the newly established G5 Sahel Joint Force. In this domain a series of courses have been conducted in Bamako in order to train together officers from the five nations, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

Improvements in the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the MaAF as a consequence of the EUTM Mali Mission

The combat capabilities and effectiveness of any army are the consequence of a number of factors and different operational areas have to be taken into considerations:

- 1 Doctrine and Organisation: The ATF is providing support to develop the many documents required for the daily work of the MaAF and the ATF Doctrine Cell is helping draft the MaAF's new Field handbooks.
- 2 MaAF combat capabilities: The numbers trained by EUTM have been substantial and have seen an improvement in the conduct of combat operations by the MaAF against terrorist groups. As their operations progress the MaAF are getting better in defending their positions, reacting against the enemy and conducting offensive actions.
- 3 Logistics: EUTM Mali has contributed through the provision of logistic training and improving the warehouse capabilities.
- 4 Command and Control capabilities: The MaAF is significantly enhancing its command and control capabilities through the newly established Joint Operations Centre (COIA) and the recent Operations Centre Staff Officers Course (CSCO) conducted by EUTM Mali to train MaAF in the planning and conduct of operations. The Operations Command and Control project (C2OPS) continues to develop in order to link the COIA with the eight Military Regions and deployed Units.
- 5 Finances: ATF is helping MaAF to apply their newly prescribed Military Law for Orientation and Programming (LOPM). This provides the tools and processes to improve the Financial and budgetary management of the MaAF.
- 6 Personnel: ATF is aiding the MaAF to improve its Human Resource and personnel management processes in terms of assigning the right person to the right position based on their competencies.



G5 Sahel Joint Force Course in Bamako with officers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger

- 7 Air Force: ATF is training the MaAF in the maintenance of the Air Bases and provides the FUSCO course at KTC which trains the Air Force security personnel in the planning, and conduct of the security and protection of these valuable Air Bases.
- 8 Medical support: EUTM Mali through the ATF Projects Cell has equipped the MaAF with 6,000 individual Field First Aid pouches and Combat Team Medic Packs. It has also provided them with the first of eight projectable Role 1 Field Medical Facilities intended for each Military region, Ambulance, GPS and medicines for operations.

It is important to note that EUTM Mali is not the only actor in Mali; others like France's Operation BARKHANE and the United Nations MINUSMA mission conduct multiple bilateral activities. EUTM Mali is the key coordinator for the training activities of these and other actors such as EUCAP and UNMAS.

Conclusions

The MaAF has improved its operational performance in Northern and Central Mali. As the operations continue and their experience grows they are improving at conducting both defensive and offensive operations against terrorist groups operating in the area. One indicator of their success is that terrorists groups are increasingly resorting to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) so as to avoid direct confrontation with the MaAF.

There has been a big effort by EUTM Mali and its partner International Missions, to improve the military capabilities of the MaAF in all areas. Every day EUTM advisers and trainers pave the way to provide more robust structures and organisation to the Malian Armed Forces with better officers and NCOs and well trained troops. By enhancing MaAFs' ability to plan operations, implement more efficient logistical, human, financial, command and control procedures, and by raising training and education standards of Malian leaders and soldiers, EUTM directly supports their fight against armed terrorist groups and plays a key role in contributing to the restoration of peace in Mali.

Improving the situation in Mali requires integrated actions in different areas and the results are to be perceived in the long term. It is clear that the deployment of EUTM Mali has already been a key factor in improving the MaAF's ability to bring increased security back to Mali and its people. With the impending onset of EUTM Mali's fourth Mandate on 18 May 2018, it is certain this can continue to be improved. ■

The European Union Training Mission in Central African Republic 2018:

Shaping the Future with the Challenges ahead

BY LT COL PEDRO DE BRITO TEIXEIRA – PPIO EUTM RCA

“This is no time for global policemen and lone warriors. Our foreign and security policy has to handle global pressures and local dynamics, it has to cope with super-powers as well as with increasingly fractured identities. Our Union will work to strengthen our partners: We will keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO, while we will also connect to new players and explore new formats. We will invest in regional orders, and in cooperation among and within regions. And we will promote reformed global governance, one that can meet the challenges of this 21st century¹.”

European Union Training Mission in Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) is part of the EU's integrated approach in the Central African Republic which aims to assist the African and wider international efforts to restore stability and support the political transition process in the country.

In coordination with the United Nations Mission for the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and other international partners in the Security Sector Reform process (SSR), EUTM RCA contributes to the preparation and implementation of the Defense Sector Reform (DSR) through three main lines of action:

- 1 Provides advice at the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Joint Army Staff levels. Staffed by the MoD, the Armed Forces and the mission, the eight working groups deal with the following topics; defence policy, education and training, human resources, communication and information systems, logistics, intelligence, budget and finance and public information. In conjunction with MINUSCA, provides advice to the Presidential teams overseeing national security policy and SSR.
- 2 Provides education to the Central African Republic Armed Forces (FACA)² commissioned and non-commissioned officers as well as specialists.

- 3 By the end of the first semester of 2018, EUTM RCA will have provided Operational Training to approximately 2,000 soldiers from three Infantry Territorial Battalions (BITs).

The essential training tasks focus on military infantry skills and collective mission essential tasks, up to battalion level such as: fire and movement, fire and manoeuvre tactics, shooting, physical training, close combat, the basics of international humanitarian law, human rights, and first aid skills.

The Mission carries out the effort in Bangui, in permanent coordination with RCA's political and military structure, MINUSCA, the European Union Delegation (EUDEL) in RCA, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and finally the Military Planning Conduct Capability (MPCC), which comprise the upper echelons of the Mission.

Lt Gen PULKKINEN, Director of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, (MPCC), based in Brussels, is the Operational Mission Commander, with Brigadier General Hermínio Maio³, of the Portuguese Army, as Mission Force Commander (MFCdr) leading a joint and multinational headquarters of 145⁴ personnel from 10 troop contributing nations, (TCNs); Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain and Sweden.

« Nous sommes ici au service de la Paix. Nous savons qu'il est beaucoup plus difficile d'obtenir la paix que de faire la guerre. Vivre en paix, est un droit élémentaire des peuples. (...) La continuité sera donc le maître-mot de notre action à venir. (...) Il reste encore beaucoup à faire, notamment dans la poursuite de la feuille de route, dont j'aimerais souligner la Loi de Programmation Militaire et celle des Infrastructures, en tant qu'instruments de modernisation et d'opérationnalisation des FACA, permettant d'avoir les moyens capacitaires indispen-

1. Mogherini, Federica, in Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe

2. Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA)

3. Maio, Hermínio Brigadier-Général, EUTM RCA Mission Force Commander, wef 11 Jan 2018

4. In accordance with the EUTM RCA data of 06 March 2018

sables d'une Armée au niveau du Commandement, de l'armement, de l'équipement, des infrastructures et du soutien logistique dans la durée.»⁵

As per the EUTM RCA 2018 MF-Cdr directive plan, the continuous enhancement of the ongoing mission achievements are linked to the three pillars and with development projects supporting the EU integrated approach. As such the collective and operational training of the third Territorial Infantry Battalion (BIT 2) by the Operational Training Pillar which started in January 2018 and the official integration on the 05 February 2018 of the first 99 graduates of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Pilot Project into the FACA are significant developments. Within the framework of the United Nations guidelines for the Security System Reform (SSR) the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) Pilot Project towards FACA integration, sees EUTM RCA provide three months military training to ex-combatants. Maintaining the momentum a second DDR course of with approximately 134 recruits drawn from all over CAR is now underway.

The Education Pillar plans, directs and synchronises the execution of courses and internships for officers and sergeants in the areas of intelligence, communications, leadership, first aid, among others, as well as in other fields of knowledge associated with human rights and international law, with the support of international organisations such as the United Nations and the International Red Cross in Bangui.

The Strategic Advisory Pillar project teams, under the leadership of French, Portuguese and Romanian officials, contributes to the organisation of the national defence and Armed Forces, in areas such as; the revision of the military programming law, infrastructure, development and operationalisation of the Armed Forces Command Operations Center of FACA, as well as the selection and execution of educational and health projects as part of the EU's integrated approach

The EUTM RCA command endeavor has been characterised by a continuous and useful synchronisation with internal and external structures and key entities, enabling the sharing of knowledge, the harmonisation of wills and strategies in a pragmatic way. Transparency and coherence are decisive in order to keep the trust among the different actors.

Future achievements are to be sustained in the planned revision of the mission plan related with the operational requirements, and the available EU integrated approach tools, in line with the strategic review of EUTM RCA. After a four year absence of FACA in support of the population outside Bangui, the presence in PAOUA of the MINUSCA Commander, FACA Commander and EUTM RCA Commander was instrumental



BIT 2 at Kassai Training Camp. The EUTM RCA Instructor issues new in-action orders to the group leader.

in identifying the current and future operational requirements. The deployment of the FACA detachment, and their performance should be analysed as a measure of EUTM supported FACA operational training, and MINUSCA's efforts to provide and to share, as much as possible, the command, control and sustainability capabilities. towards a credible engagement of the FACA forces detachments. The integration of these detachments with the forces of MINUSCA enables its employment, in response to the population's needs and to affirm the presence of the rule of law - albeit to a limited extent in the most remote areas of the CAR region.

The overarching complexity of the Security System Reform in RCA, which requires a knowledge and understanding of the interactions with neighboring states and the transparent involvement of all actors, presents to all of us a series of challenges. The domains of infrastructure, communications, agriculture, justice education and health, are some of the examples in which innovative projects may bring disruptive results (i.e., Central Africa fibre backbone project⁶).

Within the above overarching structured and embedded in the EU integrated approach, it seems reasonable to synchronise the CAR security forces deployment, CAR public services (schools, hospitals, others) and humanitarian aid support, in order to bring a unity of effort to the presence of the State and the rule of law in the different regions of CAR (e.g., BOUAR, PAOUA, others).

The richness of the EUTM RCA multinational environment, with 10 TCNs; the continuous synchronisation with MPCC (within the European Union External Action Service (EEAS)), the EU Delegation in CAR and the fruitful cooperation with IOs and NGOs ensures a pragmatic integrated approach that allows us to look with ownership and pride on the Mission. We are here to serve; to enhance the relevance of the European effort among the International Community in bringing stability, peace and development to CAR. ■

5. Maio, Herminio Brigadier-Général, EUTM RCA Mission Force Commander, 11 Jan 2018

6. The investment, which has a total cost of €33.28 million, benefits from a co-financing with the European Union of €16.6 million. It should be noted that an agreement was signed between the Bank and the European Union in December 2017.

MILEX 2017

BY LT COL PEDRO PEREZ DUENAS - ACTION OFFICER TRAINING, ANALYSIS AND EXERCISE BRANCH, EUMS CONCEPT AND CAPABILITY DIRECTORATE.

“An excellent opportunity to complete the United Kingdom’s preparations and rehearse its EU Battlegroup role.”

With this statement to the EU Military Committee, Major General (UK) Charlie STICKLAND, EU Operational Commander (OpCdr), concluded his multinational staff’s participation in Military Exercise (MILEX) 2017, which was conducted during November 2017.

MILEX is an annual EU military exercise designed to test the ability of activated EU personnel to conduct planning at the military strategic and operational levels for a potential EU-led Crisis Management Operation. For MILEX 17, Major General STICKLAND’s core EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) staff, located at Northwood in the UK, was reinforced by 22 augmentees from EU Member States. Brigadier General Manuel ROMERO CARRIL (ES) was assigned as the EU Force Commander (FCdr) with his Force Headquarters (FHQ) (reinforced by two personnel from Sweden), located at the San Marcial Division HQ Burgos, Spain.

In order to test the exercise participants and build realism, a demanding scenario was developed. This envisaged a deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the fictitious Republic of Ranua, located some 6,000 km from Europe, as a result of an ongoing conflict between the central government and rebels. To support the exercise, the EU SATCEN created scenario-specific geospatial data consisting of maps of the region together with a visualisation tool.

Exercise objectives were approved by the European Council. The OpCdr and FCdr were to quickly build their teams and conduct urgent crisis management planning for a possible EU Battlegroup-sized deployment to Ranua. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) provided Direct-

ing Staff (DISTAFF) located in Brussels to control and direct the exercise with forward elements deployed in direct support to the OHQ at Northwood and the FHQ at Burgos. Classified Communications and Information systems were established between Brussels, Northwood, Burgos and other EU institutions and bodies.

After conducting its planning, the UK EU OHQ organised a Distinguished Visitors Day at Northwood to provide key EU actors with an opportunity to enhance their knowledge of the military aspects of EU crisis management. At this event, the OpCdr and FCdr presented their respective Concept of Operations (ConOps).

To develop and build a wider understanding of the exercise and its objectives, an observation period for EU Partners was organised at Northwood. Observers from Australia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia, Serbia, Ukraine, the United States and NATO attended the initial phase of the exercise and received briefings, including a Mission Analysis briefing chaired by the OpCdr. Prior to the exercise, a briefing for partners was also conducted in Brussels to communicate the planned EU training activities, enhance transparency and facilitate further cooperation in the field of military training.

MILEX 17 proved to be a superb training vehicle for all participants. It increased knowledge of EU crisis management procedures and allowed multinational augmentees to be integrated seamlessly into a cohesive, motivated and competent staff. It provided an opportunity to conduct crisis management planning at short notice in the context of a complex and evolving scenario. In addition, the exercise contributed to the preparation of Member States capabilities committed to the EU. Cleverly the UK exploited the opportunity presented to prepare for its role as the ‘preferred’ OHQ for the Belgium/Netherlands/Luxembourg EU Battlegroups (on standby in 2018) while Spain did likewise in training its FHQ.

By the time of publication, MILEX 18, held in Rota, Spain will have concluded. It will have been the first such exercise to be conducted in a maritime environment based on a maritime scenario with characteristics similar to those of operations ATALANTA and SOPHIA. ■

Maj Gen Stickland, OpCdr EU NAVFOR Atalanta with CEUMC, Gen Kostarakos and DG EUMS, Lt Gen Pulkinnen and other guests at the MILEX17 Distinguished Visitors Day.



Picture Parade - EU Open Day 05 May 2018



The Integrated Approach? EUNAVFOR Somalia, Operation Atalanta personnel with their EUTM Mali colleagues.



EU NAVFOR Med, Op Sophia explain how their role in training the Libyan Navy and Coastguard assists European Security



EITM Mali personnel at their stand.



EUFOR BiH - Op Althea personnel discussing their role in ensuring a SASE in BiH and in building the capacity of AFBiH.




EUTM RCA personnel explain how their mission contributes to European Security.



Bottom right - EUTM Somalia discuss how their mission contributes to the security of European citizens.

EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF - EUMS STRUCTURE



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EU Military Operations and Missions

